Introduction
The interaction of the two regimes, telecommunications regulation and competition policy 1 , has become increasingly important in India, as has been in other countries, to effectively deal with the complexities of competition issues that are retarding the development of meaningful competition. Government intervention with the objective of responding to market failures, to limit abuses of market power and to improve economic efficiency, has become the need of the hour. Once the policies and institutions to deal with these complexities are in the right place, the pace and direction of the telecommunications market and development can then be left to the businesses and the consumers. A successful competition policy management in the telecommunications sector can be a catalyst to obtaining lower prices, new and better services, greater consumer choice and increased investment in the telecommunications markets.
The first part of this paper intends to explore the rationale behind competition policy intervention in telecommunications markets and highlight some of the basic concepts of competition policy that are commonly present in many markets of the world. The latter 1 The World Bank defines competition policy as -"government measures that directly affect the behavior of enterprises and the structure of industry. An appropriate competition policy includes both:(a) policies that enhance competition in local and national markets, such as liberalized trade policy, relaxed foreign investment and ownership requirements, and economic de-regulation, and (b) competition law, also referred to as antitrust or antimonopoly law, designed to prevent anticompetitive business practices by firms and unnecessary government intervention in the marketplace." Available at http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/faq/q1.htm Anjan Dasgupta (LL.M Candidate) Faculty of Law, University of Toronto 20 January, 2005 2 part intends to provide a framework for understanding some of the evolving competition policy issues in the telecommunications sector in India and the approaches that have been designed and undertaken by the Government of India and its various regulatory arms. It will deal with the current trends and approaches to competition policy in telecommunication while attempting to assess these approaches. We will also compare the Indian experience with the diverse approaches taken by different countries. This would enable us to take stock and draw out the lessons of experience in order to identify the key elements that can be adopted in India.
Competition Policy in Telecommunications

Rationale
Since the dawn of the telecommunications sector, most markets across the globe developed within the context of a government regulated monopoly. However, over the last two decades, this concept has steadily eroded and governments have come to realize that competition is the best tool for achieving those public policy goals which were previously believed to be only attainable through monopolies. Gradually, countries started introducing market liberalization measures drawing distinction between different telecommunications markets.
However, in countries where telecommunications markets have been liberalized, it has become clear that market opening by itself has been insufficient to bring about the Anjan Dasgupta (LL.M Candidate) Faculty of Law, University of Toronto 20 January, 2005 3 development of meaningful competition 2 . There still exists imperfect competition and monopoly 3 which fail to serve the interests in the long run of the telecommunications industry and the consumers 4 . "In part, this reflects commercial realities such as limited market size, economic stability, and poor returns on investment. But it also reflects current government processes for setting competition policy. In this context, it has become increasingly important for countries to have the necessary policies and institutions in place to effectively deal with the increasing quantity and complexity of competition issues that are retarding the development of meaningful competition" 5 .
Institutional Approaches
A wide array of institutional approaches has been adopted to apply competition policy in telecommunications markets 6 . At one end of the range is New Zealand, which had neither a telecommunications sector-specific regulator 7 nor until recently sector-specific legislation. Competition policy is implemented by the courts, which apply the generic competition legislation set out in the Commerce Act to the telecommunications industry 8 .
At the other end of the range, many countries have only telecommunications sector-2 Eric Lie (2002), Competition Policy in Telecommunication: Background Paper at www.itu.int/ni 3 Imperfect competition can be an important source of "market failure" and monopoly can be the result of the "market failure". Market failure occurs when resources are misallocated or allocated inefficiently. 4 In competition law, authorities mostly concerned with firms that have market power.
Firms without market power are simply not able to cause serious problems in the "relevant market". It defines relevant market as "the smallest group of products and geographic area in which a firm with market power can profitably impose a sustainable price increase". Then it proceeds to an assessment of the market share held by the largest and other firms in the relevant market. In addition the CRTC assesses other aspects like the availability of substitutes, whether a particular product or service is an essential input or bottleneck and the extent of entry barriers. 
Entry Barriers
The existence of barriers to market entry generally limits competitive response. There are many types of barriers to entry in the telecommunications market. Some of the most 
Existing Telecom Regulatory Framework in India
Telecom statutes and policy
The present telecom regulatory framework is derived principally from the archaic Indian 
Competition
Over the last decade and a half, the Indian telecommunications sector has been moving from a government monopoly to a competitive market. Until recently, the telecommunications sector almost entirely relied on sector specific policies, some of which had caused problems for the introduction of effective competitive markets. The 
Convergence Bill
The NTP-99 recognises that the IT and IWT Acts are archaic and "need to be replaced with a more forward looking Act" 43 . Considering the convergence of technology and the consequent blurring of erstwhile market segments, these Acts cannot be expected to form the bedrock of the regulatory regime. The Convergence Bill, which has been tabled before the Parliament of India, seeks to recognise and regulate the increasing convergence of telecom, broadcasting and information technology. If passed, the Convergence Bill will repeal a number of existing legislations, including the IT Act, the IWT Act, the Telegraph Wire Unlawful Possession Act, 1950, the TRAI Act and the 
Approaches to Competition in India
Tariff Regulation
The Telecommunication Tariff Order 1999 45 and the periodical amendments made thereto ("TTO") sets out the tariff at which telecommunication services within India and outside India should be provided. The order was made by the TRAI in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act. The TTO provides that the "tariff for various telecommunications services and their dates of implementation shall be as set out in schedules I to IX". It however provides that "where the authority has, for the time being forborne 46 from fixing tariffs for any telecommunications service or part thereof, a service provider shall be at liberty to fix any tariff for such telecommunication services". This clause gives the service provider the right to fix any tariff, provided that the service provider has complied with the reporting requirements and that the tariff has been agreed by the TRAI. The TTO prevents any service provider from charging in excess of "one year's rental chargeable from the subscriber for the particular telecommunications service as specified in the relevant standard package". For the purposes of fixing tariffs the TTO relates to either a "ceiling" 47 to a tariff or a "floor" 48 . If a tariff has been fixed by the TRAI, no tariff shall be fixed by any service provider in excess of such ceiling, or shall be fixed below such floor. The TTO also provides that "unless the Authority intervenes with the mandatory notice period of five working days, the service provider may implement the proposed tariff". This enables the service provider to alter a tariff (at the expiry of the five day period) but binds him to comply with the reporting requirement under the TTO. As per the TTO, TRAI can at any time modify and review any tariff, and must give "good and sufficient reasons for doing so". The TTO further provides that "no service provider shall, in any manner, discriminate between subscribers of the same class and such classification of subscribers shall not be arbitrary". This clause is applicable to all telecommunications service providers, irrespective of whether they are the incumbent operators (as they are in a dominant position and are more likely to abuse their dominant position by discriminating between subscribers) or not. By fixing the tariffs the TRAI reduces the ability of the incumbent operators to charge uncompetitive tariffs. The tariff control would also enable operators to charge competitive tariffs to their subscribers.
47 "Ceiling" is defined as "the upper limit(s) for tariff for telecommunications services as specified by the authority from time to time". 48 "Floor" is defined as the lower limit of a tariff for telecommunications service as specified by the authority from time to time below which such tariffs may not be offered. Terms and Conditions) has been prepared by the TRAI in consultation with the service providers. Based on the given model, the service providers with significant market power (i.e. a share of 30% of total activity in a licensed telecommunication service area) are required to submit their proposed RIOs to the TRAI for approval. When approved, the RIO is published and thereafter it forms the basis for all interconnection agreements to be entered into by/and with the issuer. However, the two parties concerned i.e. the interconnection provider and the seeker, may, by mutual agreement modify the terms and conditions stipulated in the published RIO.
Universal Service Obligations
The DoT has prescribed Guidelines for Implementation of Universal Service Support 54 . A Universal Service Levy ("USL"), computed as a prescribed percentage of revenue earned, is imposed on most types of telecom service providers. The resources raised through the imposition of the USL are used for fulfilling Universal Service Obligations (USO). As per the Guidelines, the implementation of USO would focus on two areas: (i) public/community telecom and information services in rural areas and (ii) individual household telephones in net high-cost rural/ remote areas. The support from Universal Service Fund is to be provided to meet net cost (i.e. cost minus revenue) of providing the universal service. A significant point made by DoT in the Guidelines is that in the event of an increase in the requirement of USO, the percentage of contribution towards USL can be raised to meet such additional requirement but that the added levy will be drawn out of the prevalent percentage of license fee keeping the ceiling intact and as such, will not cause any additional burden either on the service providers or the consumers.
Carrier Selection
With the opening up of the national and international long distance telecommunications service markets and based upon the principle that the choice of long distance carrier must be with the subscriber, the TRAI in July 2002, issued the direction on carrier selection procedures 55 . As per the directions a subscriber would be able to exercise this choice in respect of both domestic long distance as well as the international long distance carrier.
Carrier selection could either be done on 'call by call' basis, in which case a carrier access code would have to be dialed by the subscriber for routing the long distance call through a particular operator or alternatively carrier selection could also be done by a subscriber in advance by intimating the concerned operator for automatic routing of all long distance calls through a particular operator. However, the facility may not be available at all places simultaneously, as it would depend upon the type of the switching system and the feasibility of their up-gradation to meet the requirement of Carrier Selection. access providers' networks. Therefore, the extension of this facility all over the country will be phased as it will begin only at places where the new long distance operators have set up their Points of Presence (POP) and the concerned access provider's switches are modified.
Accounting Separation
A guideline stipulating a system for accounting separation was issued by the TRAI in by integrated telecom service providers. It would also help in identification of crosssubsidization practices in the industry, wherever these exist. By providing for maintenance of detailed cost records right up to the level of network elements, the system would help generate accurate information on costs, which is necessary for tariff and interconnect regulations. TRAI's document on accounting separation would go a long way in promoting healthy competition with adequate mechanisms built in to detect unfair competitive practices. While the system is mainly aimed at enabling better monitoring and control by TRAI, the system is also expected to help operators establish a more comprehensive system for arriving at product/network service wise costs and revenues and thus enhance their operating efficiency. providers would also be free to choose their area of operation during the second stage.
The TRAI contemplates the guidelines permitting automatic licensing/authorization subject to registration with the licensor and compliance with published conditions, upon payment of nominal entry fees. However, unlike the present regime, the charges for spectrum would be determined separately and spectrum allocation would occur independent of the license. acquired UASLs in all their circles of operation almost immediately after the Guidelines were published, and Bharti, the largest cellular operator, followed suit soon after.
In the course of the debate that has raged over unified licensing and the radical change that it forbears for the industry, many doubts have been expressed about the ability of the Indian regulators and telecom players to successfully manage and cope with the change.
However, a fact which is often overlooked by those harbouring such apprehensions is that this is not the first time that the Indian telecom sector has seen a drastic policy change.
As discussed earlier, the NTP 94, which heralded the entry of private players in the sector, provided for licenses to a limited number of companies per circle, such licenses being awarded on the basis of the highest bids in licence auctions. However, when due to various factors, the fixed licence fee regime was found unviable, the NTP 99 brought about a successful migration to a revenue share based licence fee structure and made the introduction of more players possible. The change from service specific licensing to unified licensing is another progressive step indicative of the evolution of the sector. It is also a demonstration of regulatory adaptability and responsiveness to the issues confronting the industry.
Though many criticisms have been leveled against the manner in which unified licensing has been introduced, an objective assessment indicates that its introduction was inevitable -the sooner the better. The extensive consultations that preceded the TRAI's recommendations and that continue even now display an institutional maturity and balanced approach that can only bode well for the future. So does the attention being given to telecom issues at the highest levels in government, as evidenced by the formation of the GoM and the quick decision making on the unified licensing issues. The impact of unified licensing will be clearer once specific guidelines are formulated for the second stage. However, some of the broad benefits of the unified licensing regime proposed by TRAI that are apparent are:
 The unified licensing regime will bring greater regulatory stability and predictability. Being consonant with global trends, it will also make it easier for foreign investors and partners to understand and evaluate the Indian regulatory structure.
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 The process of obtaining a licence for telecom services, presently a long drawn process mired with red tape will be simplified. The licensor's discretion will be minimized.
 Being technology neutral, the new regime will do away with the need for telecom regulation to constantly be amended to keep pace with the ever-changing technological developments. It also does away with technology barriers that are inherent in the current regulatory structure. It is also a logical step preceding convergence legislation and will enable a smooth transition to a converged regime.
 Because of its many advantages, a unified regime will encourage greater investment and corporate interest in the telecom sector. It will result in the creation of several business opportunities that did not exist in the previous regime due to service specific straitjacketing and licence conditions. It will also enable an enhancement of M & A activity in the sector and will make integration and consolidation easier.  The stability, greater choice and variety of services and competition safeguards that the new regime promises will benefit consumers and provide a stable foundation for the continuing growth of telecom services in the country. At a macro-economic level, the expanding tele-density will act as a driver for trade and commerce. Telecom dependant industries such as information technology and business process outsourcing will witness enhanced competitiveness on account of the availability of cheaper, better and more responsive telecom infrastructure.
The fact that various important issues such as increase in foreign investment limits, spectrum allocation, competition and interconnection are being looked into and discussed with seriousness by both the regulator and the government is a positive fallout of the WLL-M / unified licensing matter. This signals an attempt to engineer a comprehensive approach to telecom regulation in India and to respond to the needs of the sector, which is a welcome change from the past practice of piece meal and ad-hoc regulation.
Assessment
Institutional Implications -TRAI vs. Competition Commission of India
The relationship between the CCI and other statutory authorities like the TRAI is specified in Section 21 of the Competitions Act. It states that: "where in course of a proceeding before any statutory authority an issue is raised by any party that any decision which such statutory authority has taken or proposes to take, is or would be, contrary to any of the provisions of this Act (the Competition Act), then such statutory authority may make a reference in respect of such issue to the Commission (CCI). On receipt of a reference……., the Commission shall, after hearing the parties to the proceedings, give its opinion to such statutory authority which shall thereafter pass such order on the issues referred to in that sub-section as it deems fit….". It is however not clear from the Competition Act if any statutory authority can also on its own recommend to the CCI for the latter's opinion on any matter or practice in its sector, if it believes that there is a violation of the Competitions Act, which it cannot investigate and judge on its own. The
Competition Act also does not clarify the relative position of the CCI and the sector regulator with respect to any competition issue for a given sector, for instance the TRAI.
In most countries where competition law and telecommunications regulatory regimes co- 
Licensing Conditions Inhibiting Competition
In spite of the avowed policy there are several entry-level barriers and restrictions, which inhibit competition in India. There are serious and binding rollout obligations in the case of basic services and national long distance services. The main purpose of these obligations is to ensure coverage of remote and rural areas. However, the roll-out obligations impose a cost on the operator and act as an entry deterrent. With the setting up of the USL, which will provide subsidies for rural and remote area coverage, there is little rationale for these roll-out obligations. Secondly, both cellular and basic operators 59 pay a revenue share at 12% of adjusted gross revenues in metropolitan areas and Category A circles, 10% in Category B circles and 8% in Category C circles.
International and national long distance service providers are required to pay an annual revenue share at the rate of 15% of the adjusted gross revenue 60 . The revenue shares are in addition to fixed entry fees ranging from Rupees 10 million to Rupees 1.15 billion depending on the circle for basic services and Rupees 1 billion entry fee for national long distance licence. The entry fee for the fourth cellular license has been determined through 59 As per the configuration of the DoT network, the entire country is demarcated into 21 basic telecom Circles for jurisdictional purposes. Revenue shares over and above the bid amount could have a rationale in the case of cellular services licenses since in this case the bid amount and the percentage revenue share together represent the value of the limited spectrum, which comes bundled with the license. However, the rationale for charging revenue shares over and above the bid amount for services where spectrum is not an issue is not clear.
According to the ITU, the most transparent manner by which to achieve the object of low fees is through an explicit cost-recovery scheme. Cost recovery schemes involve establishment of licence fees based on the projected or actual costs of the regulator. Once the overall level of cost has been set, it is then necessary to allocate the costs among the players. However, it is generally accepted that fees should not impose unnecessary costs on the telecommunications sector 62 .
Number Portability
Number portability for consumers has been defined as "the ability of users of telecommunications services to retain existing telecommunications numbers without impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when switching from one telecommunications carrier to another" 63 . Number portability brings in a fundamental This is evident from the consultative paper on number plan issued by TRAI in 1998 66 . In this paper TRAI had dismissed number portability in two paragraphs and said that this should be considered at the appropriate time.
Though at this point in time number portability may not be of priority to TRAI nor may this be of priority for the Indian consumers, but it ought to be high on agenda soon.
Planning and deciding upon the regulatory aspects of number portability and its implementation and testing takes a lot of years. Under these circumstances it is advisable that TRAI at least sets up a consultative group with representatives from industry and consumer groups to firm up how number portability will be implemented, taking into account technology, commercial issues, and time frames. TRAI can benefit from the 
Spectrum Management
Spectrum allocation is not conjoint to licenses granted by the DoT and is subject to a separate license issued by the WPC. Spectrum is currently allocated on a first-come firstserved basis, as opposed to auctions, lotteries or comparative evaluation processes. As discussed earlier, the allocation is made pursuant to the NFAP formulated by the SACFA. for a more optimal use of spectrum and the releasing of spare bandwidth to telecom operators. The TRAI has, in May 2004 68 , published a consultation paper on spectrum issues to comprehensively deliberate upon spectrum allocation, utilisation mechanisms and fee structures under a unified licensing regime. However, no concrete solution has yet been reached on the issue of spectrum scarcity and spectrum fees.
Conclusion
It is apparent that the Indian national telecom policy and regulation -both the regulations and the regulators -will play a major role in implementing competition and telecommunications reforms. The distinctive telecommunications networks and public interest characteristics of the sector will require a continuing proactive role for regulation if network development objectives are to be met, and the foundations prepared for the next generation telecommunications services. What is unclear in India at the moment is how regulation by regulators like TRAI can best facilitate the achievement of these objectives. Should industry specific telecom regulators be redesigned as convergence regulators so they can more comprehensively and systematically address the full range of next generation competition issues? Or should they be redesigned as multi sector regulators so they can leverage synergies across infrastructures to promote the most rapid information infrastructure network rollout.
As demonstrated in this paper, today there are many competitions policies in the telecommunications sector in India. Some of them have been able to achieve their objectives and some of them have not been able to achieve the desired objectives. One of the reasons for its failure is that technologies are improving rapidly, and markets and industries are in a continuing process of realignment but the policy and regulatory frameworks have remained focused on, and constrained to the inherited boundaries of the telecom industry. Policy and regulation is lagging behind technology and markets in adapting effectively to the changing environment. It is time to examine more closely the design of next generation regulation that is capable of building the regulatory foundations for growth in network economies. This is an important matter for India and as well as for all other countries. They will all be part of the global information infrastructure network, so there will need to be a high degree of international compatibility across many of the network regulations.
One direction for next generation competition regulation in the telecom sector is giving priority to convergence issues. Regulation must focus on convergence in the sector and Telecom reform so far has been driven more by the unbundling and separation of network activities than by converging activities. During the national monopoly era, there was a high degree of convergence of activities. More recently, telecom has been separated from post; telecom services have been unbundled from facilities; broadcast television, cable, satellite, mobile and internet services have all developed as independent networks or relatively independent components of the larger telecom network, for the most part outside the sole and absolute control of incumbent telecom operators.
As pointed above, though India has begun to respond to the policy and regulatory challenges of convergence, however, a different direction influencing policy options and the design of next generation regulation gives priority to telecom reform in India. The paper does not provide definite answers to these questions but seeks to raise the policy and regulatory issues of telecommunications competition. Indeed, the answers will be different in different countries. There is no one formula that can be used in all countries.
Yet, countries like India will have to approach the issues of competition in a forward looking manner not only for determining new rules for interconnection, universal access and access to scarce resources, but also for building a regulatory framework for increasing the growth potentials in a convergent networked economy.
